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FALSE STATEMENTS BY APPLICANTS
FOR POLICIES OF LIFE INSURANCE
G. KENNETH CROWELL*
T HE innate desire of man to render himself and his dependents
secure from adverse economic consequences which attend inevita-
ble old age and death, is undoubtedly responsible more than any other
factor, for the phenomenal rise within recent years of the life insurance
business.'
"The Company that reached Seventy Millions in Seven Years."
This statement, taken from a late advertisement of a life insurance
company, may be regarded as typical of the growth in the field as a
whole. Economic depressions serve only to emphasize the necessity for
making adequate provision for financial security. If the business con-
tinues to grow as it has within the past decade, the proportions which
it will have assumed at the end of a generation are almost staggering to
contemplate. It naturally follows that such a development in a particu-
lar field has had certain far-reaching effects, and in few branches of
human activity have they been more striking than in that of the law.
When it is considered that approximately one-half of the population
of the United States are holders of life insurance policies, it is not sur-
prising that the reports contain increasingly large numbers of decisions
involving that field of law. And yet, while no accurate statistics are
presently available, it is not improbable that the number of insurance
claims contested in courts of law as compared with those voluntarily
paid, is relatively insignificant.2
A realization that the law of insurance "is a thing apart" is essential
to an intelligent understanding of its principles and rules as they have
been evolved by the courts and legislatures. The solicitude of courts
to protect the unwary individual from the over-reaching corporation,
coupled with the over-zealousness of insurers to protect themselves
from unfair and fraudulent conduct by policy holders, has resulted in
the formulation of some rather anomalous legal doctrines. The general
* The author acknowledges the assistance of Robert H. Thompson, member of
the North Dakota State Bar, in the preparation of this article.
"The following figures are significant: Total payments made by life companies
in the United States to living policyholders and beneficiaries, exclusive of
policy loans, during the depression years 1930-1934: $13,741,000,000.00; total
paid in 1934: $2,700,000,000.00; Federal relief expenditures during the same
year: $1,260,000,000.00; total number policyholders in 1934: 65,000,000; life
insurance sales, 1934: $14,000,000,000.00; life insurance in force, 1934: $98,000,-
000,000.00; total assets of life companies, 1934: $21,800,000,000.00. (Figures
compiled by National Life Underwriters Association.)
2 One of the leading life companies reports that since its organization it has
contested less than one death claim per year.
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judicial attitude has been summarized as "the tendency on the part of
courts to treat insurance contracts as in a class by themselves."8
The justification for this attitude must be found in the particular
and peculiar features which distinguished contracts of insurance from
contracts of any other type. Among these are the intricate language in
which insurance policies are couched, being quite unintelligible to the
ordinary lay mind; the fact that the words used are those of the in-
surer, which the applicant must accept without alteration or in the al-
ternative forego the desired protection; and the general practice of the
insuring public to leave it all to the agent who may or may not be a
competent and lependable adviser. These, together with other consid-
erations growing out of the superior bargaining position occupied by
the insurer, have lead the courts, wherever possible, to decline to en-
force forfeitures invoked in defense of honest claims. He who attempts
to apply to problems arising within the general insurance field, ordinary
common law principles of the law of contracts, will forthwith find him-
self in a maze of difficulties and inconsistencies.
While matters to be considered in this article are, for the most part,
common to all types of insurance, the treatment is confined to a discus-
sion of false statements (embracing representations and warranties)
and their legal significance in the field of life insurance. As a back-
ground to a critical approach to comparatively recent applicable statu-
tory enactments, the common law development will first be treated.
Emphasis throughout will naturally be placed upon Wisconsin law.4
TE COMMON LAw
A determination of the question of liability on a policy of insurance,
where the defense interposed was false statements made by the insured,
depended principally under the common law, upon whether the state-
ments were representations or warranties. A clear cut distinction be-
tween the two has long existed. It is said to have been first authori-
tatively laid down by Lord Mansfield 5 in Pawson v. Watsont as fol-
lows: "There is nQ distinction better known to those who are at all con-
3 Wilson v. Commercial Union Assurance Company, 90 Vt. 105, 96 At. 540
(1916).
See also Commissioner Roscoe Pound in German Insurance Co. v. Schader,
68 Neb. 1, 96 N.W. 604 (1903), "There has been a contest between the courts
on one hand and counsel for insurance companies on the other, the latter de-
vising skillfully framed clauses and provisions, and the former largely thwart-
ing the purpose of these clauses by construing them strictly against the insurer.
It cannot be denied that not a little subtlety has been displayed on both sides
of this contest."
4 See Helmer v. Equitable Reserve Association, 214 Wis. 270, 252 N.W. 728
(1934) for an excellent discussion of the common types of life insurance con-
tracts.5 Anderson v. Fitzgerald, 4 H.L. Cas. 484, 496, 10 Eng. R. 551 (1853).
6 2 Cowp. 785, 98 Eng. R. 1361 (1778).
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versant in the law of insurance than that which exists between a war-
ranty or condition, which makes a part of a written policy, and a
representation of the state of the case. Where it, is a part of the written
policy it must be performed. * * * Nothing tantamount will do or an-
swer the purpose. It must be strictly performed, as being part of the
agreement. * * * So that there cannot be a clearer distinction than that
between a warranty, which makes part of the written policy, and a col-
lateral representation, which, if false in a point of materiality, makes
the policy void; but if not material, it can hardly ever be fraudulent."
This view was readily adopted by the American courts and soon be-
came firmly established in the law.7 The words of Chancellor Kent are
illustrative: "A representation relates to facts or information extrinsic
to the policy. * * * Whatever averment or representation is inserted in
the policy becomes a warranty and must be strictly true."8 The later
authorities are in almost unanimous agreement that a representation
is collateral to the contract, while a warranty is a part of it.
Under the earlier law, any breach of warranty, no matter how
trifling or inconsequential, was held to avoid a policy. 9 That "a war-
ranty must be fulfilled to the letter and precludes all inquiry as to its
materiality,"'01 that "parties may contract as they please," that "No
man can be compelled to adopt a better bargain than his own,""' and
that a warranty being part of the contract defines the risk and not to
enforce it strictly would be to substitute something different from that
expressly assumed by the insurer, 12 are among the reasons advanced in
justification of this arbitrary and highly technical view. The elements
of good faith or intent" or materiality"4 were of no account. For ex-
ample, "If a house be insured against fire, and the language of the
policy is 'warranted, during the policy, to be covered with thatch,' the
insurer would be discharged if, during the insurance, the house should
be covered with wood or metal, although the risk is diminished."'5
To representations, on the other hand, were attributed less drastic
consequences. Substantial truth satisfied; and in all cases materiality
to the risk was a positive prerequisite to avoidance by reason of
falsity.'6
73 KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, (12th Ed. 1873) 282; 11 Am. &
Eng. Ency. of Law 291 (1890).
8 Ibid.
9 Campbell v. New Eng. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 98 Mass 391 (1867).
10 3 KENT, op cit. supra note 7, at 283.
"2 See Wood v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 13 Conn. 533 (1840).
12 Carter v. BoehJm, 3 Burr. 1905, 97 Eng. R. 1162 (1766) ; McGowan v. Supreme
Court of I. 0. 0. F., 107 Wis. 462, 83 N.W. 775 (1900).
13Fraser v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 114 Wis. 510, 90 N.W. 476 (1902).
14 Baumgart v. Modern Wood-men of Atm'erica, 85 Wis. 546, 55 N.W. 713 (1893).
15 See Wood v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 13 Conn. 533 (1840).
16 Prieger v. Exchange Mut. Ins. Co., 6 Wis. 89 (1859) ; Keeler v. Niagara Fire
Ins. Co., 16 Wis. 523 (1863); May v. .Buckeye Mut. Ins. Co., 25 Wis. 291
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It is evident that the doctrine of strict construction, as applied to
warranties, frequently resulted in the imposition of undue hardship
upon the insured. The courts were alert to the situation and began to
devise means of preventing forfeitures, wherever possible. Insurance
companies were cautious to include stipulations in policies making all
statements by the assured strict warranties and to incorporate such
statements as express terms of the policies.'- But the judiciary became
increasingly suspicious of such "labelling" and declined to hold that the
mere incorporation of a statement within the policy made it ipso facto
a warranty.'8 Another indication of the early trend toward liberality
was the recognition of the rule that some departure from the strict
letter of the warranty was permissible.29
As time went on, certain recognized guiding principles were formu-
lated as aids to the solution of the problem-representation or war-
ranty. The mere fact that statements appear on the face of the policy
does not give them the force of warranty. A warranty is created only
by the clearest language unmistakably indicating the intent of the
parties, and all reasonable doubts are to be resolved in favor of the in-
sured.20 Later decisions, moreover, show a marked tendency to inject
the element of materiality into the warranty.2' The result of this chang-
ing attitude was that wherever consistent with a semblance of reason,
statements were construed as representations rather than as warranties.
(1870); Morrison v. Wis. Odd Fellows Mut. L. I. Co., 59 Wis. 162, 18 N.W.
13 (1884) ; Murphy v. Aimer. Mut. Accident Assn., 90 Wis. 206, 62 N.W. 1057(1895).
17 Sayles v. North Western Ins. Co., 21 Fed. Cas. 609 (C. C. R. I. 1854) ; Silem
v. Thornton, 3 El. & B1. 868, 118 Eng. R. 1367 (1854) ; Eddy St. Iron Foundry
v. Hampshire S. & M. Fire Ins. Co., 8 Fed. Cas. 300 (C. C. R. I. 1859);
Campbell v. New Eng. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 98 Mass. 391 (1867); see also
32 C. J. 1283, 1284 (1923).
Is "The use of the word warranty in the stipulation is not very significant; cer-
tainly it does not control the construction. There may be a warranty without
the use of the word, and its use may not in every case create one." Redinan
v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 47 Wis. 89, 1 N.W. 393 (1878).
19 "A trifling departure from the letter of the condition-a mere technical
breach,-or perhaps an accidental or involuntary failure to perform the con-
dition, not sanctioned by or known to the insured, which does not increase
the risk, would not be held to defeat the policy." Copp v. The German-Amteri-
cat Ins. Co., 51 Wis. 637, 8 N.W. 127 (1881). " * * * In the absence of bad
faith its falsity will not necessarily avoid the policy, unless the variance is
substantial and material to the risk." Johnston v. Northwestern Live Stock
Ass'n., 94 Wis. 117, 68 N.W. 868 (1896).
20 May v. Buckeye Ins. Co., 25 Wis. 291 (1870) ; Rednran v. Aetna Ins. Co., 47
Wis. 89, 1. N.W. 393 (1878); United American Fire Ins. Co. v. American
Bonding Co., 146 Wis. 473, 131 N.W. 994 (1911) ; Whinfield v. Mass. Bonding
Co., 161 Wis. 1, 154 N.W. 632 (1915) ; see also Lynchburg Fire Ins. Co. v.
West, 76 Va. 575, 44 Am. Rep. 177 (1882); Scharzbach v. Ohio Valley Pro-
tective Union, 25 W. Va. 622, 52 Am. Rep. 227 (1885); Anders v. Supreme
Lodge, etc., 51 N. J. L. 175, 17 Atl. 119 (1889) ; Waterbury v. Dakota Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 6 Dak. 468, 43 N.W. 697 (1889) ; Spence v. Central Accident
Ins. Co., 236 Ill. 444, 86 N.E. 104 (1908).
21 Copp v. The German Am. Ins. Co., 51 Wis. 637, 8 N.W. 127 (1881).
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Since a representation, to be grounds for avoidance, must in all
cases be material to the risk,22 the real question is, what is materiality?
Broadly speaking, the test is, did the fact or circumstance represented
or misrepresented operate to induce the insurer to accept the risk, or
to accept it at a less premium ?23 The Wisconsin authorities, in the ab-
sence of controlling statutes, are in apparent conflict as to whether it
is essential that a misrepresentation be fraudulent or made with intent
to deceive, in addition to being material.2 4 But a later case holds that a
material representation, even though made in good faith and without
intent to deceive, vitiates the contract of insurance. 25 The well estab-
lished rule is otherwise, however, where the defense is concealment of a
material fact.26 In the latter situation, intentional and fraudulent con-
cealment must be established.
2 7
No attempt at minute analysis or rationalization has been made in
the foregoing. The general state of the law, prior to legislative entrance
to the field, has been briefly set forth as the basis for a more detailed
consideration of the present situation under the statutes.
UNDER THE STATUTES
Statutes have been enacted in a number of jurisdictions2s which, as
compared by the courts, have effected a considerable change in the
common law rules as to the legal effect of statements made by an in-
sured. The phraseology of the statutes in the different jurisdictions
varies to such an extent that generalization as to specific modifications
22 Prieger v. Exch. Mut. Ins. Co.; Kent v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co.; May v. Buckeye
Mut. Ins. Co.; Morrison v. Odd Fellows Mut. L. L Co.; Murphy v. American
Mut. Ass'n., all supra note 16.
22 3 COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw, §829.
It has been held that inquiry by the company relative to a specific matter
conclusively establishes its materiality. Cobb v. Covenant Mutual Benefit Ass'n.,
153 Mass. 176, 26 N.E. 230, 25 Am. St. Rep. 619 (1891).
24The weight of authority does not require a fraudulent intent. See 32 C. J.
1286, 1287 and cases cited.
25 Wright v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 36 Wis. 522 (1875), where, however, the
insurer knew the true state of facts; Melcher v. The Phoenix Ins. Co., 38
Wis. 665 (1875), where the company did not rely on applicant's statements but
on its own agent's judgment.26Fraser v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 114 Wis. 510, 90 N.W. 476 (1902).
27 Alkin v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 53 Wis. 136, 10 N.W. 91 (1881); Campbell
v. Amer. Fire Ins. Co., 73 Wis. 100, 40 N.W. 661 (1888); Vankirk v. Citizens'
Ins. Co., 79 Wis. 627, 48 N.W. 798 (1891) ; Johnson v. Scottish Union & Nat'l
Ins. Co., 93 Wis. 223, 67 N.W. 416 (1896).
28 The following states have statutes designed to change the common law rule
as to the legal effect of statements made by the insured: California, Connecti-
cut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebras-
ka, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Wash-
ington, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
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in the previous law is difficult, if not impossible. All, however, are ob-
viously directed toward achieving the same end, that is, the placing of
warranties and representations upon the same basis with respect to
legal significance. 29 The pronounced tendency of the courts to construe
false statements as representations rather than warranties, in order to
prevent forfeitures, has been heretofore observed. There were, though,
numerous situations in which they were compelled to place the brand
of warranty upon the false statements in question. 0 If these statutes
have served no other useful purpose they at least have relieved the
courts from the task of indulging in what frequently appeared to be
loose judicial thinking, in order to prevent the warranty from accom-
plishing its mission of destruction.3 '
The abolition of the technical common law distinctions between
representations and warranties took statutory form in Wisconsin with
the enactment of Section 4202(m), which became effective June 5,
1909.32 The only subsequent revision which is of any apparent signifi-
cance was that made by the legislature in Chapter 487, Section 252,
Laws of 1933, in which the word "actual," prior to the words "intent
29 In Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Bank, 72 Fed. 413 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896), Taft, J.,
says of them, that they were passed "to relieve against the hardships arising
from the strict enforcement at common law of warranties in insurance policies
concerning matters having no real or proximate relation to the risk assumed
by the insurer. By the aid of such warranties, and the innocent mistakes of
the insured, it often happened that the insurer was able to escape liability on
a ground having no real merit, and of the purest technicality. That such
statutes are remedial in their nature, and are quite within the police power of
the legislature is no longer a debatable question."
30 See Baumgart v. M. W. A., 85 Wis. 546, 55 N.W. 713 (1893); McGowan v.
Supreme Court of 1. 0. 0. F., etc., 107 Wis. 462, 83 N.W. 775 (1900).
31 No opinion is expressed as to whether or not the end justifies the means
adopted.
32 Section 4202 (m), Wisconsin Laws (1909) as originally passed, provided as
follows: "1. No oral or written statement, representation, or warranty made
by the insured or in his behalf in the negotiation of a contract of insurance
shall be deemed material or defeat or avoid the policy, or prevent its attach-
ing unless such statement, representation or warranty was false and made with
actual intent to deceive or unless the matter misrepresented or made a war-
ranty, increased the risk or contributed to the loss.
"2. No warranty incorporated in a contract of insurance relating to any fact
prior to a loss shall defeat or avoid such policy unless the breach of such war-
ranty increased the risk at the time of the loss; or contributed to the loss,
or unless such breach existed at the time of the loss."
By Chapter 487, Section 252, Wisconsin Laws (1933), the statute was revised
to its present form, as follows: "Insurance; application; effect. (1) No oral
or written statement, representation or warranty made by the insured or in
his behalf in the negotiation of a contract of insurance shall be deemed ma-
terial or defeat or avoid the policy, unless such statement, representation or
warranty was false and made with intent to deceive, or unless the matter mis-
represented or made a warranty increased the risk or contributed to the loss.
"2. No breach of a warranty in a policy shall defeat or avoid such policy un-
less the breach of such warranty increased the risk at the time of the loss,
or contributed to the loss, or existed at the time of the loss.
"3. This section applies to fraternal benefit societies."
Intervening revisions in the law are unimportant for present purposes.
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to deceive" was deleted. The question of what effect, if any, the re-
vision has produced has not been passed upon by the Supreme Court,
but it would appear that the result is a relaxation of the intent feature
of the statute. In other words, it seems that there is now an opening for
insurers to rely upon the doctrine of constructive fraud, which they
were probably foreclosed from asserting under the old act.
Subsection (2) of Section 209.06 of the 1933 statutes dealing with
promissory warranties will not be accorded treatment herein because
of its inapplicability to the majority of life insurance cases.
The legislative intent in the enactment of what is now Section
209.06 of the Wisconsin statutes has been dealt with in several Wiscon-
sin decisions. In Olson v. Herman Farmers Mutual Insurance Com-
pany,3 3 Jones, J. conceived the purpose of the statute to be "to mitigate
the harshness which sometimes ensued when erroneous statements had
been made by the insured causing forfeitures because they were made
in perfect good faith."34 As will appear from an analysis of the de-
cision succeeding the statute the contemplated result has been substan-
tially attained.
It has been held in Frozena v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany35 that the provisions of Section 209.06 are limited to situations
where there has been no certificate of health or recommendation of the
risk by a medical examiner, and that where there has been such certifi-
cate or recommendation, Section 209.07 exclusively governs. Unless
this is kept in mind, confusion of thought is likely to result. Therefore,
cases arising under the two types of situations will be separately con-
sidered.
NON-MEDICAL CASES3"
A critical examination of Section 209.06 will reveal that it first of
all does away with the vital distinctions between representations and
warranties made in the negotiation3 7 of a contract of insurance, by
lumping together "oral or written statements, representations or war-
33 Olson v. Herman Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 187 Wis. 15, 203 N.W. 743 (1925).
34 See also Pagel v. U. S. Casualty Co., 158 Wis. 278, 148 N.W. 878 (1914), "sec.
4202m, Stats. * * * obviously was intended by the legislature to cut off many
technical defenses."35 Frocena v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 211 Wis. 373, 247 N.W. 333 (1933).
36 This heading embraces cases in which there has been no medical examination
prior to the acceptance of the risk by the insurer, and eases in which there
has been such examination but no certificate of health or declaration of fitness
has been made by the examiner. Of course, in the vast majority of life policies
of substantial size, a recommendation is made by the physician to the com-
pany. However, industrial policies and special types of larger policies are still
issued solely upon the basis of the applicant's own statements relative to his
physical condition and medical history.
37 The word "negotiations" means the entire transaction of applying for and issu-
ing the completed contract. Everson v. General A. F. & L. Assur. Corp., 202
Mass. 169, 88 N.E. 658 (1909).
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ranties." The operative legal effect of each upon the rights of parties
to the contract is by Section 209.06 made identical. Some of the statutes
noted above 38 have stopped at this point by providing that warranties,
in the absence of fraud, are to be treated as representations, without
prescribing the conditions under which a policy may be avoided for mis-
representation by the assured. The requirements of a misrepresentation
are left unchanged by such a statute. If material, it constitutes a de-
fense, although made innocently and without any element of fraud. The
test of materiality is the same as at common law, that is, did the fact
or circumstance misrepresented operate to induce the insurer to accept
the risk or to accept it at a less premium?39 The standard is an objective
one, and the inquiry is not what the particular insurer would have done
under the circumstances had the facts been truthfully stated, but
whether the representation is one that would naturally and reasonably
influence a prudent insurer in determining whether or not to accept the
risk, or in fixing the amount of the premium in the event of such ac-
ceptance. 40 Under such statutes the courts are fully justified in holding
that whatever fact or circumstance is inquired about in the application
is prima facie material, else why would inquiry have been made? The
question, however, is, by most authorities, considered to be one of fact
for the jury.
The Wisconsin statute41 has proceeded a step further in the direc-
tion of modification of the common law rule by prescribing the precise
circumstances under which false statements4 2 will operate to avoid a
policy of insurance or defeat recovery thereon. It is provided, in effect,
that no false statement in an application shall void a policy unless it is
(1) made with intent to deceive, or (2) increased the risk, or (3) con-
tributed to the loss.43 In view of the obvious purpose which it was de-
signed to accomplish, no legitimate reason is preserved for the use of
the word "material" in the act. As a matter of fact, it is not unlikely
that its very use has produced considerable confusion and a construc-
tion not contemplated by the framers.
The most radical change from the previous law that Section 209.06
has brought about is in the legal effect of what would properly be con-
38 See pertinent statutes in states referred to supra, note 28, e.g., Section 58 of
the New York Ins. Law, "all statements I * * made by the insured shall, in the
absence of fraud, be deemed representations and not warranties * * * ." See
also, Eastern District Piece Dye Works v. Travelers' Its. Co., 234 N. Y. 441,
138 N.E. 401, 26 A. L. R. 1505 (1923).
39 Locker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 107 N. J. L. 257, 151 Atl. 627 (1930).
40 See Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Pate, 23 Ga. App. 232, 97 S.E. 874 (1919).
41 Wis. STAT. (1933) §209.06.4 2 The term is employed in its broad sense as including both representations and
warranties.
43 See Demirjian v. New York Life Ins. Co., 205 Wis. 71, 236 N.W. 566 (1931).
4- Ibid.
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strued as a warranty at common law. A warranty, if not literally true,
even though made without intent to deceive and with respect to a mat-
ter immaterial to the risk, avoided the policy. Under the statutes, a
false warranty, unless it is made with intent to deceive or increases the
risk or contributes to the loss is of no consequence. The act has rather
effectually stripped the warranty of most of its vitality.
What has Section 209.06 done to the representation? Probably little
or nothing, as it has been construed by the Wisconsin court. Since the
three separate grounds for avoidance are connected in the statutes by
the disjunctive "or"4 5 it would appear that an entirely reasonable con-
struction would be that the existence of but one is required. Concretely
applied, a false representation made with, intent to deceive, might
logically be held a defense, whether or not it be material, increases the
risk, or contributes to the loss. No Wisconsin decision so holds, but the
question has never been passed upon by the court. In view of the mis-
chief that Section 209.06 was obviously designed to remedy, it is
reasonably safe to predict that such a construction would not be sanc-
tioned, since it would distinctly liberalize, rather than restrict, the com-
mon law rule which imposed upon all misrepresentations the positive
requirement of materiality.4 6
Undoubtedly, the most perplexing problem presented by the statute
is that of its effect upon the concept of materiality. It would seem that
the statute lays down a new test for materiality, that is, that a false
statement is material if (1) the risk is thereby increased, or (2) if it
contributes to the loss. If this hypothesis is correct, a significant limita-
tion is placed upon the common law rule of materiality, since a state-
ment which finight influence the insurer in determining whether to ac-
cept the risk does not necessarily increase the risk or contribute to the
loss.4 ' The authorities on this particular question are in decided con-"
flict. The leading case supporting the construction set forth above is
O'Keefe v. Zurich General Accident & Liability Insurance Company,8
in which the court stated relative to a North Dakota statute essentially
5 Olson v. Herman Farmers Mit. Ins. Co., 187 Wis. 15, 203 N.W. 743 (1925).
46 The proper construction of the statute is undoubtedly that adopted by the
Minnesota court in Johnson v. National Life Ins. Co., 123 Minn. 453, 144 N.W.
218 (1913), where it is stated relative to the Minnesota statute, essentially
similar to Section 209.06 of the Wisconsin Statutes, "As we construe the statute
a material misrepresentation, made with intent to deceive and defraud, avoids
the policy. A material misrepresentation, not made with intent to deceive or
defraud, does not avoid the policy unless by the misrepresentation the risk of
loss is increased, If a material misrepresentation increases the risk of loss, the
policy is avoided, regardless of the intent with which it was made. An im-
material representation, though made with intent to deceive and defraud, does
not avoid the policy."
47 E.g., statements relating to other insurance in force, prior applications for
other policies, earnings, occupation, etc.
48 O'Keefe v. Zurich A. & L. Ins. Co., 43 F. (2d) 809 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930).
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the same as Section 209.06, "No change was accomplished, if, after its
adoption in the same sense as before, whatever affects the acceptance
of the risk still defeats the policy."'4 9
In spite of the evident purpose of the statute it appears that the
Wisconsin court is committed to the rule that what affects the ac-
ceptance of the risk, increases the risk of loss.50 It should be observed,
however, that in decisions containing language approving a broad con-
struction of the phrases "increased the risk" or "contributed to the
loss" the representations proved, beyond controversy, did increase the
risk or contributed to the loss, so that the results reached are therefore
correct under either construction.
To indicate the treatment which has been accorded the statutory
requirements of intent to deceive, increase of risk, and contribution to
loss (death in life insurance), the principal Wisconsin decisions deal-
ing with each will be separately considered. 51
Intent to Deceive52
The understandable reluctance of courts and juries to attribute to
deceased persons that stigma of fraud accounts in no small measure for
49 The court states elsewhere in the opinion " * * * it (the North Dakota statute)
seems to us to mean that misrepresentation or false statement made in an
application for insurance is ipso facto a defense. It is a defense only when it
is proved that 'the matter misrepresented increased the risk of loss,' that is to
say, when it is proved that the hazard insured against would be more likely
to happen in the real state of facts than in the state of facts not actually exist-
ing, but falsely represented as the real state of facts.' Accord under similar
statutes: Everson v. Assurance Corp., 202 Mass. 169, 88 N.E. 658 (1909);
Provident etc. Co. v. Wiaynes, Adm., 131 Ky. 84, 93 S.W. 1049 (1906) ; Her-
many v. Life Ass'n., 151 Pa. 17, 24 Atl. 1064 (1892).
50 See Calligaro v. Midland Casualty Co., 211 Wis. 319, 247 N.W. 846 (1933),
action on accident policy. The court stated, "The fact that the company would
have rejected the application if it had known that Calligaro was a bar-
tender in a speak-easy shows that the matter misrepresented (his occupation)
increased the risk"
Demiriian v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 205 Wis. 71, 236 N.W. 566 (1931); action
on life policy, "If questions material to the risk are answered falsely, the risk
is necessarily increased."
Monahan v. Mutual Life I-is. Co., 192 Wis. 102, 212 N.W. 269 (1927), action
on life policy, " * * * three physicians, through whose hands applications for
life insurance in the appellant company generally passed, testified without con-
tradiction that the disclosure of the facts would have resulted in a rejection
of her application. We therefore conclude that the false statements made by
the insured increased the risk and contributed to the loss."
Conklin v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 200 Wis. 94, 227 N.W. 251 (1929), in which
the court approved a decision of the trial court which stated that "if the appli-
cant had truthfully answered all questions, the information thus given, together
with truthful answers 'might have prevented the issuance of the policy" (italics
supplied) ;Flikeid v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 163 Minn. 134, 203 N.W. 600 (1925);
Hughes Bros. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 148 Tenn. 293, 255 S.W. 363 (1923).
51 The justification for this resort to "briefing technique" is the anticipated value
of familiarity with some of the' factual situations which have been deemed
to satisfy the demands of the statute.52Whether the striking of the word "actual" from Section 209.06(1) by the
legislature in 1933 produces any significant change in effect remains a matter
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the relatively few cases in which an intent to deceive has been found to
exist. The primary difficulty attending its proof is that in most life in-
surance cases the alleged deceiver is dead, cannot be questioned, and
the conclusion must be based upon inferences drawn from all of the
circumstances.
In Monahan v. Mutual Life Insurance Company53 the insured, a
school teacher, did not state, in response to direct questions in her
application for a life insurance policy, that she had consulted a physi-
cian 24 days prior to the application and that he had diagnosed her ill-
ness as appendicitis. Death resulted from tubercular peritonitis six
months after the date of the application. The jury found that the state-
ments were false but that there was no intent to deceive. In reversing
the judgment, the Supreme Court held that the evidence disclosed, as a
matter of law, an actual intent to deceive, since no inference consistent
with an innocent purpose on the part of the insured could be drawn
from the facts or circumstances.
The insured in Conklin v. New York Life Ins. Co.54 made false
answers to questions in the application dealing with past condition of
health and medical treatment. The court held that the trial judge rightly
changed the jury's finding of absence of intent to deceive and stated
that, "It seems incredible that an intelligent man such as the deceased
undoubtedly was, who had been treated for diabetes over a period of
more than a year with eleven days in a hospital, could forget such
weighty and material matters * * *. The false answers could have been
made for no other possible purpose than to induce reliance upon them
and thereby deceive the defendant company. The judgment of the trial
court was therefore correct."
In Frozena v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company the applicant
denied any ailment or disease of the stomach and medical treatment.
The evidence revealed that for several years prior to the application he
had complained of frequent sharp pains in his stomach and had con-
sulted a physician relative to this condition. The jury found that the
insured "was subject to such pains and ailments" and was conscious
thereof when he made his application, but that the statements were not
made with the intention of deceiving the insurer and inducing the issu-
ance of the policy. The appellate court found no room for an innocent
interpretation of the insured's conduct and declared " * * * we can dis-
cover no ground upon which deliberate or intentional withholding of
this information could be made without intent to deceive."
of conjecture. It is suggested that it may open the door for the entrance of
misrepresentations resulting from mistake, ignorance, accident or negligence.
5 Calligaro v. Midland Cas. Co.; Demiriian v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co.; Monahan V.
Mutual Life Ins. Co.; Conklin v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co.., all supra note 50.
5- Ibid.55 Frozena v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 211 Wis. 373, 247 N.W. 333 (1933).
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"Want of education and low intelligence" first appears as a circum-
stance to be taken into account in determining intent to deceive in
Demirjian v. New York Life Insurance Company5" and it was de-
termined that the jury's finding of no intent to deceive was not unwar-
ranted. A distinction based upon relative intelligence was made between
the case before the court and the Monahan case5 7 where the insured
was a school teacher, and the Conklin case 58 involving a creamery
operator, "who was undoubtedly a man of intelligence."
The possibility that the applicant for an accident policy may not
have differentiated in his mind between a soft drink parlor and a speak-
easy was held sufficient to sustain a jury finding of absence of intent
to deceive in Calligaro v. Midland Casualty Company.59 Apparently the
physical location of the so-called "spot" is a factor to be accorded
weight, since it is said in the opinion, "to him a soft drink parlor in or
near to Hurley may have meant an ordinary speak-easy."
Increase of Risk
A satisfactory analysis of the cases in this particular group is made
difficult because of the apparent failure of the Wisconsin courts to
recognize any distinction between the terms "material to the risk" and
"increases the risk."60 In short, under the Wisconsin decisions, the vital
inquiry is: If the matter had been truthfully represented, would the
policy have been issued ?"1 It seems also that the standard is an indi-
vidual one and not that of the "prudent insurer." The general type of
misrepresentations in applications which are considered to increase the
risk are fairly definitely set forth in the decisions.62
A frequently referred to case is McGowan v. Supreme Court of
Independent Order of Foresters63 where it is said that "all of the ques-
tions as to the health, or death, or age at death, of the ancestors or
56 Demnirjian v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 205 Wis. 71. 236 N.W. 566 (1931).
57 Calligaro v. Midland Cas. Co.; Demirfian v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co.; Monahan v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co.; Conklin v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., all supra note 50.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid, see discussion.
61 Ibid, cases and discussion; Whinfield v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 162 Wis.
1, 154 N.W. 632 (1916), where it was held in an action on an indemnity bond
that the misrepresentation in the principal's application as to the quantity of
securities held by the defaulting agent, for the principal, did not increase the
risk or contribute to the loss because the insurer had made an independent
investigation and therefore did not rely upon the applicant's statements.62 Calligaro v. Midland Casualty Co., 211 Wis. 319, 247 N.W. 846 (1933) ; Delzir-
jian v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 205 Wis. 71, 236 N.W. 566 (1931); Monahan v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 192 Wis. 102, 212 N.W. 269 (1927); Conklin v. N. Y.
Life Ins. Co., 200 Wis. 94. 227 N.W. 251 (1929) ; cf. Wood V. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., 13 Conn. 533 (1840); Olson v. Herman Farmers Mutual Ins. Co.,
187 Wis. 15, 203 N.W. 743 (1925).63McGowan v. Supreme Court I. 0. 0. F., 104 Wis. 173, 80 N.W. 603 (1899).
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brothers and sisters of the deceased, were material to the risk as a
matter of law, and the court should have so declared." And in Demir-
fian v. New York Life Insurance Company64 it was held that ulcers of
the stomach increased the risk as a matter of law. After quoting the
rule posited in the McGowan case65 the court continues: "With strong-
er reasons are questions as to the insured's own health previous to the
application material to the risk."
In Monahan v. Mutual Life Insurance Company66 the existence
shortly before the making of the application of an ailment diagnosed
as appendicitis was held to have increased the risk and contributed to
the loss, the court stating that "this is a matter of common knowledge."
Representations as to past medical treatment and consultations with
physicians are similarly treated.6 7 The age of the applicant would un-
doubtedly also be held to increase the risk as a matter of law. The de-
cisions up to the present time lay down no rule with respect to numer-
ous other, perhaps less vital, subjects relative to which information is
sought by the insurer in the application. It is suggested that since, under
Section 209.06(1) the question properly is, Did the matter misrepre-
sented increase the risk?, the issue is one of fact unless it is one con-
cerning which reasonable men could not differ. 68
Contributes to Loss
The Wisconsin statute, 69 unlike those in most other states,7 0 contains
the alternative provision "or contributed to the loss." Action upon a
policy of life insurance may, therefore, be defeated if the false state-
ment contributed to the insured's death, although in no sense did it
increase the risk. A particular representation, more frequently than not,
will produce both consequences, but not necessarily. The scope of ju-
dicial inquiry in the second is much narrower than in the first. A false
statement increases the risk if it enhances the probability of death
from any cause. It contributes to the loss only if it had some causal
relationship to the particular death in question. The conclusion that
something contributes to the death must very often be based solely
upon the opinion testimony of medical men.
No Wisconsin decisions have been discovered in which the matter
misrepresented was held to contribute to the death, but not to increase
64Demirjian v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 205 Wis. 71, 236 N.W. 566 (1931).
65 McGowan v. Sup. Ct. I. 0. 0. F., 104 Wis. 173, 80 N.W. 603 (1899).
66 Calligaro v. Midland Casualty Co.; Deiniriian v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co.; Mona-
han v. Mut. Life Ins. Co.; Conklin v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., all supra note 50.67Peterson v. L 0. 0. F., 162 Wis. 562, 156 N.W. 951 (1916).
68 O'Keefe v. Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liability Ins. Co., 43 F. (2d) 809 (C.C.A. 8th,
1930).
69 WIs. STAT. (1933) §209.06(1).
70 Compare statutes of states cited note 28, supra.
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the risk. In the Monahan case7' where the applicant failed to report a
previous diagnosis of appendicitis and death ensued from tubercular
peritonitis in the abdominal region, the court held that the'false state-
ment both increased the risk and contributed to the loss. The matter
misrepresented in the Demirfian case72 (previous ailments and consul-
tation with a physician) was found by the jury not to have contributed
to the loss, but the Supreme Court held the risk was necessarily in-
creased.
73
MEDICAL EXAMINATION CASES
Situations embraced within this group are those in which the in-
surer's medical examiner has issued a certificate of health or recom-
mended the applicant to the company as a fit subject for insurance.74
The Wisconsin legislature has declared by an act which became effec-
tive on July 3, 1911"5 (now Section 209.07) that where such is the
case, the insurer "shall thereby be estopped from setting up in defense
of an action on a policy issued thereon that the insured was not in the
condition of health required by the policy at the time of the issue or
delivery thereof, unless the same was procured by or through the fraud
or deceit of the insured."7 Similar statutes are found in Iowa77 and
South Dakota.78
This statute, just like Section 209.06, represents a distinct departure
from the common law rules of the legal effect of false statements made
by applicants for life insurance. It carries on, in a sense, from the point
71 Calligaro v. Midland Cas. Co.; Dentiriian v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co.; Monahan v.
Mut. Life Ins. Co.; Conklin v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., all supra note 50.
72 Demirjian v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 205 Wis. 71, 236 N.W. 566 (1931).
73 The cause of death is not given in the reported case.
74 Practically all of the larger policies are in this category.
75 Section 4202s, Wisconsin Session Laws (1911), as originally enacted provided
as follows: "In any case where the medical examiner, or physician acting as
such, of any life or disability insurance company or association doing business
in this State, shall issue a certificate of health or declare the applicant a fit
subject for insurance, or so report to the company or association or its agent%
under the rules and regulations of such company or association, it shall there-
by be estopped from setting up in defense of an action on such policy or cer-
tificate that the insured was not in the condition of health required by the
policy at the time of the issue or delivery thereof, unless the same was pro-
cured by or through the fraud or deceit of the insured."
In its present form, Section 209.07 provides as follows: "Estoppel by report
of 'medical examiner, effect of fraud. If the medical examiner of any life or
disability insurance company shall issue a certificate of health, or declare the
applicant a fit subject for insurance, or so report to the company or its agent
under the rules and regulations of such company, it shall thereby be estopped
from setting up in defense of an action on a policy issued thereon that the
insured was not in the condition of health required by the policy at the time
of the issue or delivery thereof, unless the same was procured by or through
the fraud or deceit of the insured. This section shall apply to fraternal benefit
societies."
Intervening amendments are unimportant
76 Wis. STAT. (1933) §209.07.
7 See Mickel v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 204 Iowa 421, 213 N.W. 765 (1927).
78 See Cunningham v. R. N. A., 24 S. D. 489, 124 N.W. 434 (1910).
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where Section 209.06 stops, by depriving insurers of the defense of
false statements pertaining to past or present condition of health re-
gardless of materiality, increase of risk or contribution to loss, in all
cases where the company's medical examiner has certified the applicant
to be a fit subject for insurance.
The theory of Section 209.07 seems to be eminently fair and
reasonable. It says, in effect, that where the insurer has chosen to con-
duct an independent investigation of the applicant's physical condition
through one of its own skilled experts, it will not, in the absence of
fraud or deceit practiced on the examiner, be permitted to interpose
as a defense the physical infirmities of the insured, of which it knew
or might have known as a result of the examination. 9
The statute presents several rather perplexing problems in con-
struction which will be briefly considered in the light of the relevant
Wisconsin cases and those decided by the Iowa courts dealing with an
identical statute.80
1. Who is the medical examiner? In Iowa, it was held in Peterson
v. Des Moines Life Associations ' that the medical examiner or physi-
cian contemplated in this section is the person who examines the appli-
cant, determines his condition of health and reports whether he is a
proper risk and not the general medical adviser or director at the home
office, whose advice is taken into account in determining whether the
risk should be accepted.
2. To what does the estoppel extend? In express terms, the statute
declares that the estoppel is as to condition of health at the time of
issue or delivery of the policy. The company is estopped from showing
the falsity of statements made in the application or to the examining
physician, so far as they relate to the health of the insured and his
acceptability as a risk on that account. In the Peterson case8 2 it is held
that the estoppel applies to statements as to previous sickness, treat-
ment, accident, etc., since such statements "bear only upon the health
and physical condition at the time the company is asked to accept the
risk, and it is the evident purpose of the statute to limit inquiry with
reference to the truth of these statements to the question whether as-
sured, by fraudulent representations or concealments, induced the
medical examiner to recommend the risk so far as health and physical
79 See Weimer v. Economic Life Ass'n. of Clinton, 108 Iowa 451, 79 N.W. 123
1899; but cf. Whinfield v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 162 Wis. 1, 154 N.W.
632 (1916).
80 The Iowa cases referred to herein were decided prior to the enactment of
what is now Section 209.07, Wisconsin Statutes, and under familiar principles
are to be generally taken as authoritative precedents.
81 Peterson v. Des Moines Life Ass'n., 115 Iowa 668, 87 N.W. 397 (1901).
82 Ibid.
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condition are concerned, when, if the assured had acted in good faith,
such a recommendation would not have been made."
What of statements as to age, occupation, other insurance and al-
lied matters, which are taken into account in determining whether the
applicant is a suitable risk? "Condition of health" is but one of the
elements of acceptability of the risk. As to statements pertaining to
other subjects of inquiry, Section 209.07 is inapplicable, the estoppel is
not raised, and Section 209.06 should govern. 83
3. To what do the words "the same" refer? That from a gram-
matical point of view Section 209.07 is a rather crude exhibition of
draftsmanship, is evidenced by the large number of Iowa cases, in
which the question has been raised as to whether the fraud or deceit
specified in the statute relates to obtaining the certificate of the exam-
iner or to obtaining the policy of insurance.8 4 Not until 1933 in Frozena
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company" was the problem judicially
solved in Wisconsin with the pronouncement, in agreement with the
Iowa authorities, that the fraud or deceit referred to is that, "practiced
by the insured upon the medical examiner in order to induce a favor-
able report."
4. What is fraud or deceit within the meaning of the statute? This
question arose in the Monahan case,8 6 the facts of which have been
previously stated. It was there held that reference must be made to
Section 209.06 "in determining what constituted such fraud and deceit,"
and that when this is done, it is found that it is not sufficient to prove
that the statements were merely false, but it must appear that they were
made with actual intent to deceive.8 7 On the facts of the Monahan case
it was concluded that the false statements (relative to health, history
and medical attendance) were made with intent to deceive and consti-
tuted a procurement of the examiner's favorable report by fraud and
deceit.8 8
If the certificate of fitness is issued pursuant to a conspiracy or
connivance between the examiner and the applicant, the insurer is
clearly entitled to show such situation, and if established, the estoppel
is not raised. 9 However, in Klieger v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
83 Ibid.
84 Weiner v. Econ. Life Ass'n. of Clinton, 108 Iowa 451, 79 N.W. 123 (1899);
Stewart v. Equitable Mut. Life Ass. Ass'n., 110 Iowa 528, 81 N.W. 782 (1900);
Wood v. Farmers Life Ass'n, 121 Iowa 44, 95 N.W. 226 (1903) ; Roe v. Na-
tional Life Ins. Ass'n., 137 Iowa 696, 115 N.W. 500 (1908).
85 Frozena v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 211 Wis. 373, 247 N.W. 333 (1933).
86 Calligaro v. Midland Cas. Co.; Demirjian v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co.; Monahan v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co.; Conklin v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., all supra note 50.
87 This case was decided before the word "actual" was deleted from the statute.
88 Frozena v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 211 Wis. 373, 247 N.W. 333 (1933).
8 9 McGinty v. Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, 166 Wis. 83, 164 N.W. 249
(1917).
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Company90 where the jury found that correct information was given to
the examiner by the applicant, it was held that the former was the agent
of the company and that his omissions or mistakes were those of the
company and not the insured.
A question of considerable import, which arises in connection with
the scope of Section 209.07 is whether the statute precludes application
of the so-called rule of "continuing representation." There is an impos-
ing array of authorities recognizing the rule that if, after the applica-
tion for insurance and before the consummation of the contract, (gen-
erally by delivery of the policy and payment of the initial premium)
the applicant has died, or there has been a material change in his health,
the insured, or those claiming under him are under a legal obligation
to inform the insurer of such known changes.91 Statements made in the
application are treated as continuing to the time when the policy be-
comes a binding contract and, though once true, they become false upon
the occurrence if an intervening material change in health.
This duty of disclosure, failure to perform which voids the policy,
has been sanctioned by the Wisconsin courts in Blommer v. Phoenix
Insurance Company92 as being applicable to fire insurance. There are
no life insurance decisions in Wisconsin passing upon the question
either before or after the enactment of Section 209.07. The Iowa court,
reasoning that the estoppel created by the statute extends to all matters
concerning condition of health down to the time of the issue or delivery
of the policy, refused to impose the duty of notification upon the in-
sured in Mickel v. Mutual Life Insurance Company.93 The wisdom of
so broad an interpretation of the estoppel statute is open to serious
doubt as appliedparticularly to a state of facts where delivery of the
policy is unduly delayed, and where such delay is occasioned through
the fault of the insured, such as inability to meet the first premium pay-
ment. The statute must contemplate that the medical examination and
the consummation of the contract shall be reasonably contemporaneous
acts. The medical investigation is necessarily confined to ascertaining
90 Klieger v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 180 Wis. 102, 212 N.W. 269 (1927).
91 Trail v. Baring, 10 L.T. (N.s.) 215, 4 DeG. J. & S. 318, 46 Eng. R. 941 (C. of
A. 1864) ; Canning v. Farquhar, 16 Q.B.D. 728 (C. of A. 1886) ; Harrington v.
Pearl Life Ins. Co., 30 L.T. 613 (C. of A. 1914); Looker v. Law Union &
Rock Ins. Co., [1928] 1 K.B. 554; Piedmont v. Arlington Life Ins. Co., 92
U. S. 377, 23 L. ed. 610 (1876); Stipcich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 277
U. S. 311, 48 Sup. Ct. 512, 72 L. Ed. 895 (1928); New York Life v. Gay, 36
F. (2d) 634 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929); Security Life v. Booms, 31 Cal. App. 119,
159 Pac. 1000 (1916); McKenzie v. Northwestern Mutual Life, 26 Ga. App.
222, 105 S.E. 720 (1921) ; Goldstein v. New York Life Ins. Co., 162 N. Y. Supp.
1088, 125 N.E. 898 (1917) ; Gordon v. Prudential Ins. Co., 231 Pa. 404, 80 Ati.
882 (1911) ; Fitzgerald v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 90 Vt. 291, 98 Atl. 498
(1916).92 Blumer v. The Phoenix Ins. Co., 45 Wis. 622 (1878).9 3 Mickel v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 204 Iowa 421, 213 N.W. 765 (1927).
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the state of health at the time it was made. It seems entirely reasonable
to conclude that the logical justification for the statutory estoppel dis-
appears if the insurer is prevented from showing a condition of health
inconsistent with that represented, where that condition could not con-
ceivably have been discovered by the examiner.
Conclusion
It is evident that a great deal has been accomplished by legislative
entrance into a field where a change in the substantive law to meet
changing conditions would otherwise have been quite impossible. The
growth is away from the formalistic to the common sense attitude.
False statements made by applicants for insurance policies should be
grounds for avoidance under certain circumstances. It is difficult, how-
ever, to support with the force of reason the common law warranty
rule permitting avoidance for immaterial false statements made in good
faith.
That under the statutes the law remains in a state of some confusion
is not surprising when the history of false statements in the law of in-
surance prior to legislation is thoroughly appreciated. The problem of
the immediate future is not change but clarification.
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